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This study is the second to provide a richer test of the association between 
uuditor size and audit fees by using three audit firm size classes in the 
small-client segment of the US. audit market. ?’he finding of a Big 8 (now 
Big 6)  price premium is consistent with Francis and Simon [ I ] .  However, 
this price premium exists only with respect to localhegionaljrms. Francis 
2nd Simon showed that the Big 8 price premium exists with respect to 
both second-tier and local/regional jirms. The present study also provides 
evidence of a second-tier price premium over locaVregiona1 firms. The 
results imply product diferentiution to both Big 8 and second-tier firms. 
Plausible reasons for direrences in results between the two studies are 
given. 
A study by Francis and Sinion [ 1 J of audit pricing in the small-client segment 
of the U.S. audit market provides evidence consistent with the finding of Palmrose 
[2] that a Big 8 (now Big 6)’ price premium is observed for small auditees. The 
study by Francis and Simon [ l ]  was undertaken since Simunic [3] and Palmrose 
[2] reported contradictory findings about a Big 8 audit price premium in the 
“small” auditee segment of the U.S. audit market for publicly traded companies. 
Simunic [3] found no price difference between Big 8 and non-Big 8 auditors for 
small auditees. Francis and Simon [ I ]  concluded that size sensitivity in the U.S. 
audit market might explain the different results obtained by Palmrose [2] as com- 
pared with Simunic [3]. Auditee size is comparable between studies by Francis and 
Simon and Palmrose (mean assets of $ 3 0 4 0  million) compared with somewhat 
larger firms in Simunic’s (mean assets of $177 million) study? 
In addition to providing evidence on audit pricing in the small-client segment 
*Assistant Professor of Accounting, School of Accounting, University of Oklahoma 
I .  The Big 8 auditors were Arthur Andersen. Arthur Young, Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells, Ernst and Whinney. Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse. and Touche Ross. 
Since the collection of data for this study in 1987, Ernst and Whinney and Arthur Young merged; and, 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells and Touche Ross merged. These firms arc currently referred to as the Big 
6 instead of the Big 8. 
2. Francis and Stokes [4] demonstrate that the ability to observe a Big 8 price premium may be 
sensitive to fhe delinilion of auditee size. They observed Big 8 premiums for very small auditees (mean 
assets of $1.8 million Australian) as did Francis [ 5 ]  for somewhat larger auditees (mean assets of $49 
million Auslralinn). but Francis and Stokes did not observe a Big 8 price premium for the very largest 
auditees (mean assets of $603 million Australian). 
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of the U.S. market, Francis and Simon is the only study to date to use three classes 
of audit firm size in addition to the Big 8Inon-Big 8 dichotomy. The classes were 
Big 8 firms, second-tier firms,3 and other local or regional firms. The use of three 
size classes provided a richer test of the association between auditor size and audit 
fees than in prior audit fee research. They found that the Big 8 price premium 
exists with respect to both second-tier national firms and local/regional firms. Since 
the assumption of competitiveness in the small auditee segment (due to the large 
number of audit suppliers) can be made a priori, thc cxistence of a price premium 
implies Big 8 product differentiation. 
The purpose of the present study is to provide additional tests of pricing by 
second-tier firms compared to Big 8 and to local/regional firms. The need for this 
research is evident by the fact that few studies have focused on the small-client 
segment of the U.S. audit market, and Francis and Simon is the only study to 
provide evidence on pricing by second-tier firms. This study covers the same time 
period as Francis and Simon and also uses the three classes of audit firm size in 
addition to the Big Wnon-Big 8 dichotomy. Since Francis and Simon is the only 
study to use three firm size classes, its replication would provide confirming cvi- 
dence; if the results are not replicable, that will also be of intercst. Thc basic pricing 
model developed by Simunic [3], and subsequcntly used in other audit pricing 
studies, is used for thc present study. 
1. Sample Selection and Research Design 
A sample of 287 publicly held companies with assets of less than $150 million 
was contacted during 1987 through a questionnaire mailed to the controller or chief 
financial officer. The criteria for the selection of companies (auditees) was as fol- 
lows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The auditee must be a publicly held company listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or Over thc 
Counter (OTC). 
The auditee must not be a foreign based company or a subsidiary of another 
company. 
The auditee must not be a conglomerate. 
The sample consisted only of publicly held companies. Criterion 2 was included to 
make sure the fee was not counted more than once, and criterion 3 was included to 
3. The second-tier firms are Alexander Grant, Fox & Co., KMG Main Hurdman. Kenneth Lev- 
enthal, Laventhol and Horwath, McGladrey Hendrickson and Pullen, Oppenheim Appel Dixon. Pannell 
Kerr Forster, and Seidman and Seidman. These firms have been idcntificd as making up the second- 
tier by such sources as the Public Accounting Report and Ute Accounting Wars [13]. Alexander Grant 
and Fox & Co. merged in 1985; however, there are no audits in thc sample, o f  the present study, done 
by the merged firm. Peat Marwick Mitchell mcrgcd with KMG Main Hurdman in 1986. These mergers 
were taken into consideration when defining the sample period, of  the present study, as 1983-1985 to 
avoid confounding effects of  the merged firms. 
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avoid confounding effects of auditees operating across regulated and nonregulated 
industries precluding identification of the major industry in which the auditee op- 
erates. The sample size was determined, in part, based on industry membership and 
expected response rate. For instance, companies identified in certain industries (e.g., 
air transportation, railroad transportation, beverages, and motor vehicle and equip- 
ment) were dropped from the sample due to a perceived lack of interest to partic- 
ipate and an informal assessment of the cost-benefit of sampling these companies. 
To ensure that second-tier and other IocaVregional auditors wcre included, the sam- 
ple was further restricted to auditees with assets less than $150 million. This same 
size cutoff was used to define small auditees by Palmrose [2], and is comparable 
to the size cutoff of $125 million in sales used by Francis and Simon [l]. The 
sample size was limited further by excluding initial audit engagements because 
of the possible effects of price cutting or low balling and by budgctary constraints. 
Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, arid Executives [6] 
and Who Audits America [7] were used as the data sources. The one page ques- 
tionnaire consisted of itcms on audit fees, consolidated subsidiaries, number of 
physical operating locations visited by the cxternal auditor, and internal audit ac- 
tivity, which were not available from public data sourccs such as the annual report 
and Who Audits America [7]. 
Data for fiscal years ending 1983 through 1985 were requested on each au- 
ditee.4 Sixty-three companies responded for a 22 percent response rate.5 Observa- 
tions for eight companies in the sample were not usable because the audit fee was 
not separable from other fees paid to the external auditor, and/or there were in- 
complete data items. The usable sample of 55 companies represents 19 percent of 
the original sample of 287 companies, or 87 percent of the 63 responding to the 
survey. One hundred thirty-nine responses were obtained from the 55 companies 
retained in the sample. Somc companies indicated that the data was not readily 
available for earlier years. 
Based on the literature [1,2,3,4,5] referred to previously, thc following set of 
variables is selected to control for cross-sectional differences in external audit fees: 
auditee size (Assets), number of consolidated subsidiaries (Subs), foreign assets 
(FA), return on investment (ROI), long-term debt to total assets (DA), internal audit 
activity (IAA, measured as annual internal audit payroll to total assets), type of 
4. Three years of data were requested to assess whether any systematic differences existed among 
the sampling years. When dummy trend variables were included in the model to identify the year of 
the audit fee observation, they were not found to be significant. The trend variables did not indicate a 
systematic difference among sampling years and these variables, therefore, are omitted from the models. 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic was examined because of the possibility of serial dependency froin 
using three years of pooled data. The DW statistic of 1.602 and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
of, 132 indicate no evidence of serial correlation. The results of these tests provide the basis for pooling 
the observations across the sample years. 
5. This study covers fiscal years ending in 1983-1985, whereas Francis and Simon’s study covers 
fiscal years ending from January I ,  1984, through June 30. 1985. The response rate (22 percent) of 
this study is also comparable to that (23 percent) of Francis and Simon. 
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audit opinion (OP), and an indicator of regulated/nonregulated industry member- 
ship (I). 
Control variables measuring total year-end assets (Assets), the number of con- 
solidated subsidiaries (Subs), and foreign assets to total assets (FA) are intended 
to control for the size and complexity of auditee operations. Simunic [3] defined 
thesc factors as “loss exposure” variables or the amount of assets the auditee has 
at risk. 
Control variables measuring the type of audit opinion (OP), net income or loss 
to total assets (ROI), and total long-term debt to total assets (DA) are intended to 
control for the loss-sharing ratio between the auditor and the auditee since each 
can be held jointly and sevcrally liable for misleading financial statements. These 
variables are constructs of factors that measure the amount of financial distress of 
the auditee. It is expected that thc lower the return on investment, the higher the 
audit fee; and, the higher the amount of long-term debt in the capital structure, the 
higher the audit fee. In these situations, thc greater financial distress of the auditee 
results in greater risk being assumed by the auditor. Also, qualified “subject to” 
opinions (OP coded “ I ” )  are expected to result in highcr audit fees than unqual- 
ified and consistency exception opinions (OP codcd “0”). The uncertainty asso- 
ciated with the “subject to” qualified opinion results in greater risk and/or 
additional audit procedures for the auditor. 
Internal audit activity (IAA) and industry membership (I) werc not included 
in the model by Francis and Simon [l]. The variable (IAA) measuring internal 
audit activity is a surrogate for the amount of work performcd by the internal audit 
department. Studies by Palmrose [2] and Wallace [8] indicate a ncgativc relation- 
ship between the amount of audit fees paid and the amount of work performed by 
the internal audit department. Thus, the inclusion of this variable would appear to 
be necessary for a properly specified model. 
Studies by Palmrose [2] and Simunic [3] indicate that audit fees tend to bc 
higher in nonregulated industries compared to regulated industries. Since thc thcory 
for this finding is not well developed, no direction is hypothesized for the industry 
variable (I) of the present study. Danos and Eichenseher [9,10,1 I ] ,  however, pro- 
vide evidence that client regulatory complexity confers scale opportunities to large 
CPA firms. They posit that these production economies of scale exist, in general, 
in the context of specialization. If cost savings are passed on to the auditees, thc 
work of Danos and Eichenseher would seem to suggest higher fees charged by 
large CPA firms in nonregulated industries compared with regulated industries. This 
would also seem to support the findings of Palmrose and Simunic. On the other 
hand, higher fees charged in regulated industries should not be a surprise. To the 
extent that regulation demands greater auditor expertise, one would expect that 
auditors would price in order to recover their investment incurred in generating 
that expertise. Thus, the economic rationale would support the prediction of a 
higher fee. 
Once these variables are controlled, an audit firm size test variable is added 
to the model. A Big 8/non-Big 8 firm size variable is added to the model for the 
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total sample. Subsequently, three subsamples are created, testing the following di- 
chotomous firm size variables: Big 8 versus second-tier firms, Big 8 versus other 
local/regional finns, arid second-tier versus other local/regional firms. A fifth model 
tests both Big 8 and second-tier firm size indicator variables for the total sample. 
Again, Francis and Simon is the only study to date to provide evidence on this 
richer test of the association between auditor size and audit fees. A replication of 
their findings would be a contribution to the literature; on the other hand, if thcir 
results are not replicable, this would also be a contribution and would indicate a 
need for further research in  the area. 
The final fee model selected is as follows: 
Lfee = SQAssets + SQSubs + FA - ROI + DA - IAA + OP 7 I + Firm, 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fee and the explan- 
atory variables are: 
SQAssets = square-root of total year-end asscts, 
SQSubs = square-root of the number of consolidatcd subsidiaries, 
FA = total foreign assets to total assets, 
ROI = net income (loss) to total assets, 
DA = total long-term debt to total asscts, 
IAA = internal audit activity measured as annual internal audit pay- 
roll to total assets, 
OP = type of audit opinion with “ I ”  = “Subjcct to” qualified 
opinion and “0” = unqualified or consistency exception 
opinions, 
= industry membership with “1”  = mcmbcr of a nonregulated 
industry and “0” = member of a rcgulated industry, and 
= firm size variable coded “ I ”  for Big 8 or second-tier and 
“0” for non-Big 8 in the total samplc; for the subsamples 
the firm size variable will be tested as: (1) “1” for Big 8 
and “0” for second-tier firm, (2) “1” for Big 8 and “0” for 
other local/regional tirm, and (3) “1” for second-tier and 
“0” for othcr local/regional firm. 
I 
Firm 
The models are run and the rcsults are compared to that of Francis and Simon. 
2. Results 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 for variables in the multiple re- 
gression fec model. Mean assets are $43.4 million, which is somewhat larger than 
Francis and Simon [ I ]  with average assets of $30 million and very close to Palm- 
rose [2] with average assets of $40 million. The mean assets for each of these 
studics arc considerably smaller than that of Simunic [3], who had average assets 
of $177 million. 
The Big 8 audited 38 percent of the sample. The mean assets audited by the 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Firm 
Big 8 Non-Big 8 Total 
Number of Observations 
Fee 
Assets 
Subs 
FA 
ROI“ 
DA 
IAA 
YO of observations with “subject to” opinion 
% of observations in Regulated industries” 
Yo of Second-tier firms 
Mean (Standard deviation) 
53 
74.06t 
60,970.36t 
(42,795.55t) 
3.96 
(4.61) 
1.34 
(5.64) 
.03 
.23 
.02 
(54.55 t) 
(.08) 
(.20) 
(.07) 
1.9% 
30.2% 
86 
39.29t 
(36.85t) 
32,578.27t 
(41,125.79t) 
1.94 
(1.89) 
.12 
- .03 
676) 
(.21) 
(.W 
( .OO) 
.18 
.oo 
10.5% 
33.7% 
58.1 % 
139 
52.53 
(47.38t) 
43,404.03t 
(43,856.85t) 
2.71 
.58 
(3.56) 
- .01 
.20 
.u1 
(3.34) 
(.W 
(.20) 
604) 
7.2% 
32.4% 
“A good proportion (47/139) of the sample is represented by Oil & Gas Companies. During 
the period of this study (1983-1985) many Oil & Gas Companies reported losses due to thc 
slump in the industry. This explains, at least in part, why the averages are low. 
bIndustries classified as regulated in the sample are Trucking, Telecommunication, Gas & 
Electric Utilities, Savings & Loan, and Insurance. These industries have been traditionally clas- 
sified as regulated, though Trucking and Telecommunication have been deregulated by the 1980s 
to a substantive degree. 
Fee-Annual external audit fee. 
Assets-Total year end assets. 
Subs-Number of consolidated subsidiaries. 
FA-Foreign assets to total assets. 
ROI-Net income (loss) to total esscts. 
DA-Long-term debt to total assets. 
IAA-Internal audit activity measured as annual internal audit payroll to total assets. 
Big 8 and non-Big 8 are $61 million and $33 million, respectively. The mean 
number of consolidated subsidiaries of companies audited by Big 8 and non-Big 8 
are 3.96 and 1.94, respectively. Companies audited by the Big 8 firms appear to 
be larger and more complex than the companies audited by non-Big 8 firms. The 
related mean audit fees for Big 8 and non-Big 8 firms are $74 thousand and $39 
thousand, respectively. The regression equation does control for the cross-sectional 
differences in auditee characteristics. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
AUDIT PRICING IN THE SMALL-CLIENT SEGMENT 229 
The ordinary least-squares estimates for each of the fivc regressions are re- 
ported in Table 2. Good linear fits are achieved in the five regressions. Values of 
adjusted R2 range from .73 to .80. Tests such as Kolmogorov D statistic for nor- 
mally distributed residuals and Goldfeld-Quandt [ 121 for constant variance did not 
indicatc any violations of the assumptions of the regression modeL6 Further, the 
correlatim matrix suggests no collinearity problems among the independent vari- 
ables. The higher correlation (S9) among the firm size variables is expected since 
both Big 8 and second-ticr are coded “0” for other local/regional firms. 
According to the regression models in Table 2, SQAssets was positive and 
significant in all the models at a = .01, and SQSubs was positive and significant 
in all of the models at a = .I0 or less. FA was positive and significant in four of 
the five models at a = .I0 or less. A variable, DA, measuring the amount of long- 
term debt in the capital structure was positive and significant in three models at a 
= -10 or less. Also a “crude” industry variable, I, measuring regulatedhonregu- 
latcd industry membership was positive and significant in four of the five models 
at a = .05 or less. All of these control variables were in the direction expected. 
No direction was hypothesized for I. Other control variables were not significant, 
but were included to minimize the chance for model misspecification. It is inter- 
esting to note that when SQAsscts is included as the only independent variable, it 
explains 70 percent of the variation in audit fees. When SQSubs and FA are added 
the adjusted R2 increases to 71 percent. Thus, auditee size and complexity appear 
to explain most of the variation in audit fees. 
The regression estimate for the Big 8 firm size test variable indicates the ex- 
istence of a Big 8 price premium. In the test of the Big 8 vcrsus all non-Big 
8 auditors, the Big 8 coefficient is positive and significant at a = .05. This rcsult 
is consistent with Francis and Simon [ I ]  and Palmrose [2 ] ,  but inconsistent 
with Simunic [3] who did not find a price difference. As explained previous- 
ly, this difference in findings may be attributable to the fact that the companies 
in Simunic’s sample are considerably larger than the companies of the other sam- 
ples. 
The subsample analyses indicate that the Big 8 premium exists only with 
respect to other locallregional firms. In the test of the Big 8 versus second-tier 
auditors, the Big 8 coefficient is not significant at convcntional levels. Perhaps the 
second-tier firm brand name is just as valuable as the Big 8 brand name in the 
small-auditee market segment. In the test of the Big 8 versus locallrcgional firms, 
the Big 8 coefficient is positive and significant at a = .01. These results are somc- 
6. A null hypothesis that thc residuals are normally distributed cannot be rejected at the .05 level 
for the sample using the Kolmogorov Smirnov test contained in the SAS program. The Goldfeld-Quandt 
test is used to test for violation of the constant variance assumption. The null hypothesis of homosce- 
dasticity cannot be rejected at the .05 level for the model. In the Goldfeld-Quandt test. regression 
models are run on an upper and lower proportion of sample observations. A central number of obser- 
vations are omitted. The null hypothesis is that the sum of squared errors for the upper and lower 
percentages of the sample arc equal. The central 20 percent of the observations were dropped for this 
test. 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Estimates 
Coeficients ((-statistics) 
Big 8 vs 
Big 8 vs Big 8 vs Big 8 vs Seconrf-tier vs Second-Tier vs 
Non-Big 8 Second-rier LocaWRegional LocaWRegionnl LocaWRegional 
Variable (full sample) (subsample) (subsample) (subsample) (full sample) 
Intercept 
SQAssets 
SQSubs 
FA 
ROI 
DA 
IAA 
OP 
I 
Firm-Big 8 
Firm-Second-tier 
Sample 
Adjusted R2 
F-ratio 
1.75 
(9.13)* 
.01 
(13.92)* 
.08 
.o I 
-.11 
(- .42) 
.22 
-.38 
(- .32) 
.09 
.21 
(2.16)** 
.I8 
(1.91)** 
(2.n1)* 
(.81) 
(.96) 
(.50) 
n=139 
.73 
41.74’ 
2.40 
(13.79)* 
.01 
(13.46)* 
.02 
(1.61)*** 
.02 
(1.96)** 
.02 
(.07) 
.58 
(2.25) * * 
-.27 
.09 
.05 
( - .29) 
(56) 
(.61) 
-.04 
-.43 
n=103 
.75 
34.65* 
1.57 
(6.64) * 
.01 
(6.96)* 
.02 
(2.18)** 
.02 
-.18 
( - S6) 
.29 
1.14 
.38 
.24 
$24 
(1.94) ** 
.72 
(5.51)* 
(1.34)*** 
634) 
(.71) 
n=89 
.80 
40.16* 
1.40 
(6.13)* 
.01 
(9.56)* 
.09 
.12 
.I7 
.35 
.53 
(.41) 
- .09 
(- .53) 
.28 
(2.45)’ 
(3.97)* 
(1.80)” 
(.63) 
(1.33)*** 
.66 
(5.15)* 
n=86 
.77 
32.23* 
1.57 
(9.25)* 
.01 
(12.54)* 
.03 
(1.57)*** 
.02 
(1.63)** 
.06 
(.26) 
.41 
(2.00)** 
.36 
(. 30) 
- .02 
(-.14) 
.21 
(2.42)* 
.65 
.69 
(6.51)* 
n=139 
.79 
53.83* 
(5.8Y)* 
Significance levels (one-tail tests): * = .01, ** = .05, *** = .lo. 
SQAssets-Square-root of total assets. 
SQSubs-Square-root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries. 
FA-Foreign assets to total assets. 
ROI-Net income (loss) to total assets. 
DA-Long-term debt to total assets. 
IAA-Internal audit activity measured as annual internal audit payroll to total assets. 
OP-Type of audit opinion with “1” = “subject to” qualified opinion and “0” = 
I-Industry membership with “1” = member of a nonregulated industry and “0” = 
Firm-Big 8-Big 8 firm indicator with “1” = Big 8 firm and “0” = other. 
Firm-Second-tier-Second-tier indicator with “1” = Second-tier firm and “0” = other. 
unqualified or consistency exception opinions. 
member of a regulated industry. 
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what different from Francis and Simon’s in that they found a Big 8 price premium 
to exist with respect to both second-tier and local/regional firms. The difference in 
results between this study and Francis and Simon could be attributable to a number 
of factors. For instance, the average assets of this study are $13.4 million greater 
than that of Francis and Simon. Further, even though the response rates were com- 
parable, the Francis and Simon .sample was considerably larger with 208 obser- 
vations. Given that the present study is based on a considerably smaller sample the 
results are, all other things being equal, less generalizable than theirs. The present 
study, however, did cover the same time period as Francis and Simon. 
Sevcral variables were included in this study that were not considered by Fran- 
cis and Simon; those variables includc thc internal audit activity variable (IAA) 
and the regulated/nonregulated industry indicator variable (I). Nevertheless, these 
two variables do not appear to account for the difference i n  these studies. When 
the data is run without IAA and I the basic results are unchanged.’ The IAA 
variable was not significant in this study, but it was tested and controlled. There 
is no indication that Francis and Simon considered the effect of the existence of 
internal auditors. Further, the industry indicator variable was positive and signifi- 
cant at a = .05 or better for four of the five models. The industry variable is not 
significant for the model of Big 8 versus second-tier firms, which is one of the 
models that differs between the studies. Francis and Simon did not control for 
industry effects (not even crudely as done here), but did indicate that their sample 
was well dispersed across industries. The results of the industry variable are con- 
sistent with Palmrose [2] and Simunic [3] that audit fees tend to be higher in 
nonregulated industrics compared to regulated. 
The present study also provided evidence of a second-tier price prcmium over 
local/regional firms. The second-tier firm size variable was positive and significant 
at a = .01. Francis and Simon found no difference in audit pricing between second- 
tier and local/regional firms in their sample. Factors that could account for the 
difference in results were already discussed. Since only two studies (considering 
the present one) to date have examined three audit firm size classes in the small 
auditee segment of the US. market and those studies are not totally consistent, the 
need for further research is apparent. The use of the three size classes does provide 
a richer test of the association between auditor size and audit fees. 
Finally, the regression on the full sample using two auditor variables (Big 8 
and second-tier) is consistent with the subsample results. The Big 8 coefficient is 
significant, indicating a price premium over local/regional firms, and the second- 
tier coefficient is significant, indicating a price premium over local/regional firms. 
7. The findings of  the present study with respect to the auditor size variable are unchanged when 
IAA and I are dropped. However, it  is not known whether the results of the study by Francis and 
Simon would remain substantially unchanged with the inclusion of these variables in their models. 
Thus. one cannot be totally certain that these two variables do not account for the difference in the two 
studies. 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
232 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
3. Further Tests for Model Misspecification 
Since Table 1 shows that there may be systematic differences between clients 
audited by the Big 8 versus the non-Big 8, further analysis is necessary to determine 
whether these underlying differences in the two sets of companies are driving the 
empirical results on the auditor variables. If the regression model used in this study 
is misspecified, then it is possible for cross-sectional differences among the inde- 
pendent variables to confound the auditor size variable. As auditee size increases 
there is a greater likelihood of having a Big 8 auditor, and it is therefore possible 
that the auditor size variable is really picking up a residual auditee size effect. 
Although the regression equation controls for cross-sectional differences in 
auditee characteristics, the tests discussed in this section provide additional assur- 
ance that these differences are not driving the results. For instance, if auditee size 
is a confounding variable, an alternative specification of the model would be to 
deflate audit fee by auditee size [1,3] rather than including it as an independent 
variable. When this alternative model was estimated the results werc similar. 
A second test was performed by adding interaction tcrms to thc model for thc 
Big 8 dummy variable with each of the other independent variablcs. Thc intcraction 
terms deal with the possibility that the auditor dummy variable captures not only 
intercept differences between regressions for different auditor classcs, but also slope 
effects due to a confounding of auditor size and othcr independent variables. With 
the interaction terms in the model, thc Big 8 variable remaincd positive and sig- 
nificant at 01 = .01. The only interaction tcrms that wcrc significant werc SQSubs, 
FA, and ROI, all of which had positive cocfficicnts. 
The additional tests discusscd in  this section support the basic results reported 
in Table 2. It does not appcar that undcrlying differences between clients audited 
by the Big 8 versus thc non-Big 8 are driving the results on the auditor variables. 
4. Conclusion 
The main purposc of this study was to provide further evidence with respect 
to audit pricing by second-ticr firms compared to Big 8 and localhegional firms in 
the small-clicnt segment of the U.S. audit market. The evidence from this sample 
strongly supports the cxistcnce of a Big 8 price premium, which is consistent with 
Francis and Simon and Palmrose. This is the second study to use three classes of 
audit firm size. Francis and Simon were the first to use three classes of audit firm 
size and provided evidence that the Big 8 price premium exists with respect to 
both second-tier and localhegional firms. The present study provides evidence that 
thc Big 8 price premium exists only with respect to localhegional firms. Perhaps 
thc second-tier firm brand name is just as valuable as the Big 8 brand name in  this 
markct segment, that is, smaller publicly listed companies. Further, the present 
study provides evidence of a second-tier price premium over local/regional firms. 
Differences in auditee size, sample size, and model specification may explain the 
difference in results for the two studies. 
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Given the assumption of competition in the small auditee market segment, 
higher Big 8 prices imply Big 8 product differentiation. This study is not only 
consistent with Francis and Simon and Palmrose in the U.S. market, but also with 
studies of the Australian market [4,5]. The second-tier price premium would also 
imply product differentiation, given the assumed competitiveness of the small- 
auditee market segment. 
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